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Empirical and observational studies of animal cogni-
tion will truly benefit if different behavioural manifes-
tations of higher cognitive processes can be defined 
functionally. This is vitally important because, when 
studying animals, cognition has to necessarily manifest 
in behaviour for it to be tractable, and the performance 
of such behaviour, in turn, needs to be unambiguously 
ascribed to an effect of particular cognitive processes. 
One theoretical framework to investigate cognition in 
animals in terms of mentalistic notions is that of the 
intentional stance, which assumes that each individual 
is an intentional system capable of mental states like 
beliefs, desires and emotions. To attribute such mental 
states to both oneself and to others is to have what has 
been termed a theory of mind. Social primates appear 
to be knowledgeable about one another’s behaviour to 
different extents. But do they know as much about one 
another’s beliefs and intentions? Are they adept at 
recognizing the similarities and differences between 
their own and others’ states of mind? Attribution of 
mental states to other individuals could manifest itself 
in diverse situations as, for example, when individual 
animals closely observe the actions of others, when 
they interact competitively, or when they deceive each 
other in the social sphere. Such behavioural constructs 
need to be analysed carefully in order to ascertain 
whether true higher-order intentionality can indeed 
be invoked as underlying mechanisms governing these 
acts. This article examines the possible cognitive bases 
of social knowledge-based decision-making and tactical 
deception, processes that appear to be integral to the 
development and maintenance of social relationships 
in wild bonnet macaques (Macaca radiata), a primate 
species endemic to peninsular India. 
 
EMPIRICAL studies on the cognitive abilities of non-
human primates and their underlying mechanisms deve-
loped primarily because we assume that their intelligence 
and, if one may use the term, minds are most like our 
own. Through our understanding of them, we would pos-
sibly one day understand what it is like to be essentially 
human. However, this view that they are most like us also 
coexists in our minds with the equally pervasive idea that 
non-human primates differ fundamentally from us because 
they lack sophisticated language, and may, thus, also lack 
some of the capacities necessary for reasoning and  
abstract thought. Given the recent developments in our 
understanding of the cognitive abilities of many primates, 
including the possible existence of rudimentary semantic 
communication in some species1,2, nevertheless, com-
parative studies on primate taxa may yet throw light on 
the nature and evolution of different human cognitive 
abilities, including that holy grail of current cognitive 
research – consciousness3. 
 This article first briefly reviews some theoretical  
approaches that utilize observations of behaviour to exa-
mine the phenomenon of the animal mind. Two specific 
examples of social behaviour, knowledge-based decision-
making and tactical deception displayed by bonnet  
macaques are then examined in terms of the possible under-
lying cognitive processes in an effort to obtain some 
glimpses into the non-human primate mind. 
The primate mind 
A feature that commonly characterizes most primates, 
including the great apes and humans is the presence of a 
complex society in which individuals spend most of their 
lives. Extensive social interactions among individuals of 
different ages, sexes, dominance ranks and kinship are 
typical of many of these societies4. The development and 
maintenance of such complex social relationships – each 
different in its own way – are believed to have placed 
unusual demands and selected for enhanced cognitive 
abilities in individuals living in such societies5–7. If this is 
true, and if indeed there has been a general increase in 
social complexity – in at least some of its dimensions –
during the course of primate evolution, does this provide 
at least indirect evidence that there has been a progres-
sive evolution of the primate mind, culminating in the 
human mind as well? 
 Although there is now increasing belief that primate 
minds can be rather complex, the question of whether 
non-human primates can be considered truly conscious 
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continues to be a controversial one. Related to this prob-
lem is perhaps one of the most difficult aspects of study-
ing consciousness – that of providing an objective scien-
tific definition of the phenomenon. This definition 
obviously has to be functional in order that it can be dis-
sected out analytically. And it becomes an even greater 
problem when studying non-human primates – because 
consciousness then has to manifest itself in behaviour –
behaviour that can be unambiguously ascribed to being 
an effect of being conscious. 
 Of the numerous definitions of consciousness that exist 
in the literature, perhaps the most functional that have 
been proposed are perceptual consciousness, the ability 
to possess certain mental states, including emotions, 
thoughts, beliefs, desires or memories, and reflective 
consciousness, the recognition by the thinking subject of 
its own perceptions and mental states3. In other words, if 
an animal were perceptually conscious, it would be able 
to possess certain mental states – it might, for example, 
be able to believe, think or remember. If, in addition, it 
were reflectively conscious, it would be aware of its own 
mental states – whether they are beliefs, thoughts or 
memories. Current thinking holds that some of the higher 
primates may indeed be perceptually conscious, but are 
extremely unlikely to be reflectively so1. The principal 
reason for this bias against the belief that primates can 
reflect on their thoughts and actions may, however, 
largely be methodological: people can tell us what they 
are aware of, monkeys cannot. 
 
Intentionality and attribution 
Functionally, an elegant theoretical framework to inves-
tigate higher cognitive processes in non-human primates 
in terms of mentalistic notions is that of Dennett’s inten-
tional stance8,9. If one assumes that animals are inten-
tional systems capable of mental states like beliefs, 
desires and emotions, it is possible to consider them as 
beings with different levels of intentionality. Note that a 
particular individual of any species can be in different 
intentional states depending on the cognitive basis of the 
particular behaviour performed. Under this framework, 
however, each species has a unique position with regard 
to the highest order of intentionality that it can ever 
achieve, although lower-order intentional behaviours can 
always be exhibited. 
 To give an example (adapted from ref. 1), bonnet  
macaques typically give alarm calls to potential predators 
such as leopards or wild dogs. On hearing an alarm call 
given by a particular individual, the other troop members 
immediately run up trees and then scan for the predator. 
Theoretically, this behaviour could be considered under 
different orders of intentionality, as explained below, 
although studies in cognitive psychology will aim to deter-
mine exactly which order it belongs to. 
Zero-order 
An individual has no beliefs or desires at all. All behav-
ioural actions in this category are thus instinctive, invaria-
bly evoked in response to specific stimuli. 
 If the bonnet macaque alarm call truly belongs to this 
category, it must be hypothesized that bonnet macaques 
give alarm calls as a mere response to a stimulus – the 
sight of a predator – and no actual desires or beliefs are 
involved in this reaction. 
 
First-order 
An individual has beliefs or desires, but no beliefs about 
beliefs. Behavioural acts can thus be generated intentionally 
by the actor who, however, need not have any conception 
of the audience’s mental states. 
 In this case, therefore, bonnet macaque alarm calls are 
given because the caller believes that there is a predator 
nearby, although it may have no comprehension of the 
belief system of its troop members. 
 
Second-order 
Some conception exists about both one’s own and other 
individuals’ states of mind. An individual may thus behave 
in a particular way because it wants others to believe in 
something. 
 A bonnet macaque may thus give alarm calls because it 
wants its troop members to believe that there is a predator 
lurking nearby. 
Third-order 
At this level, an individual may want others to believe 
that it has a particular belief or is in a specific emotional 
state, or that it wants others to believe that it wants them 
to respond in a particular manner. 
 If bonnet macaques are truly third-order intentional 
systems, an alarm call may be given because the caller 
wants the other individuals to believe that it wants them 
to rush up the trees. 
 Human beings are typically third-order intentional sys-
tems exhibiting a wide variety of behaviours that can be 
classified under different orders of intentionality. When a 
human subject removes a finger from a pinprick or a 
flame involuntarily, for example, it is a zero-order inten-
tional system, since there are no desires or beliefs associated 
with this behavioural act. Human linguistic communica-
tion, on the other hand, is a notable example of a system 
where the actor (or speaker) makes its own mental states 
apparent to the audience; this clearly and essentially re-
quires third-order intentionality. 
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 Higher-order intentionality (including second- and 
third-order levels) is interesting because it requires the 
ability to represent simultaneously two different states of 
mind – that of the actor and of the audience. To do this, 
an individual must recognize, for example, that it has 
knowledge, others have knowledge, and that there may 
be a discrepancy between them – or, for that matter,  
between any of the intentional states held by these  
two minds. Unfortunately, very few studies – either in  
the wild or in captivity – have so far extensively tested 
for these alternative capacities of intentionality in pri-
mates. 
 An important functional manifestation of higher-order 
intentionality, and also of perceptual consciousness, is 
attribution, whereby an individual is capable of attribut-
ing thoughts, emotions and desires to another individual 
(reviewed in ref. 1). It is evident that primates are know-
ledgeable about each other’s behaviour, to the extent that 
they can often predict and act upon this knowledge even 
before a behavioural interaction has occurred10. But do 
primates know as much about each other’s beliefs, emo- 
tions and intentions? To attribute beliefs, knowledge  
and emotions to both oneself and to others is to have a 
theory of mind, first outlined by Premack and Wood-
ruff11. And if indeed primates are able to attribute a 
mind – or more functionally, mental states – to each 
other, are they capable of recognizing the similarities and 
differences between their own and others’ states of mind 
as well? 
 The principal advantage that an animal enjoys if it is 
able to recognize that other individuals have beliefs 
which might be different from its own, is that it becomes 
capable of immensely more flexible and adaptive behaviour. 
It might then be able to manipulate another individual’s 
actions and beliefs in a great variety of social situations. 
Furthermore, if it can recognize ignorance in others, it 
can selectively reveal and withhold information from 
them. Again, novel information can be transmitted across 
individuals by active teaching rather than by the rela-
tively slow process of observational learning. However, 
there has almost been no such systematic studies of attri-
bution of mental states in social animals, including non-
human primates except in the great apes (reviewed in refs 
1 and 2). 
 
Predicting behaviour or predicting mental 
states? 
Perhaps the most difficult problem in understanding cog-
nitive processes in non-verbal subjects – be they pre-
verbal human infants or truly non-verbal primates – is the 
question of whether an individual is discriminating bet-
ween others’ states of mind or simply reacting to differ-
ences in their behaviour patterns. While it is evident that 
true mind-reading can only be achieved through some 
form of behavioural analysis and can, therefore, perhaps 
be considered a sub-category of behaviour-reading12,13,  
it becomes important in certain situations, as, for exam-
ple, in the analysis of deceptive interactions, to diffe- 
rentiate between actual behaviour analysis and the more 
cognitively sophisticated (as well as evolutionarily  
advanced?) mentalism. Although many philosophers  
of mind have argued that these two processes represent 
mutually exclusive phenomena (for example, ref. 14),  
it can be better argued and examples provided from  
human cognitive processes to demonstrate that they rep-
resent two positions on a possible continuum (see also 
ref. 15). 
 A theoretical concept of how mental states could be 
considered as intervening variables, facilitating the recog-
nition of a number of otherwise complex stimulus–
response links (each of which could independently form 
the basis of a behaviour-reading process) has been ele-
gantly proposed by Whiten12,13. Drawing from an earlier 
concept in psychology, it suggests that any number of 
observable conditions could lead an individual to recog-
nize a certain specific mental state in another individual, 
and once this state has been attributed, to predict a defin-
able number of behavioural outcomes depending on the 
ambient situation. A crucial advantage of this model is 
that the coding of each of these intervening variables (or 
the so-called mental states) would be more ‘economic of 
representational resources’13 than would be the multitude 
of the stimulus–response links that each now represents. 
This is particularly true for mental states which are 
achievable by many different conditions and which can, 
in turn, affect a number of different outcomes. Mind-
reading or the recognition of mental states, by such a 
definition, could thus constitute a more neurologically 
economic strategy than would a collection of independent 
stimulus–response pathways that represent behaviour-
reading. Note also that according to this concept, mentalism 
arises gradually from behaviour analysis – if the inter-
vening variable mediates the recognition of and response 
to only a single stimulus–response link, it is virtually 
indistinguishable from behaviour-reading. 
 Yet another line of evidence that can potentially argue 
for mentalism as an underlying cognitive process rather 
than simple behaviour analysis, at least in certain situa-
tions, is that of projection of experience16 (succinctly 
reviewed in ref. 13). This has stemmed from studies on 
role reversal in cooperative tasks in which an individual 
primate was first trained to perform a definite task to aid 
another individual in reaching a desired goal, following 
which it was asked to take on the role of the other indi-
vidual. These experiments have suggested that the great 
apes, notably chimpanzees, are able to master new roles 
with ease and perform novel tasks, perhaps because they 
can attribute beliefs and desires to one another; their per-
formance cannot be explained by simple learning of the 
behaviour of their partner before role reversal. Rhesus 
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macaques, on the other hand, appear to lack empathy and, 
in order to successfully complete such cooperative tasks, 
have to learn their new roles afresh17. 
 A philosophical assumption that seems to be implicit 
in all discussions over whether individual primates are 
able to recognize mental states or simply perform behaviour 
analysis is that principles of parsimony are violated when 
mind-reading is invoked in non-verbal non-human pri-
mates. Such an assumption perhaps owes its origin to the 
subtle influences that Biblical tradition and Cartesian 
philosophy seem to have had on Western scientific ideo-
logy, which has, often implicitly, valued the inherent 
superiority of man over all other forms of life. Although 
outside the scope of this article, it is important to stress 
here that it is perhaps now time to re-evaluate such an 
assumption, and concepts such as that of mental states as 
economical intervening variables, discussed above, are 
important steps in this direction (see also ref. 18). 
 In the remaining part of the article, the possible cogni-
tive mechanisms involved in two complex social pro-
cesses displayed by wild bonnet macaques – social 
knowledge-based decision-making and tactical decep-
tion – will be analysed. Particular attempts will also be 
made to explore the conceptual contribution that attribu-
tion of mental states as well as orders of intentionality 
could offer towards an understanding of these mecha-
nisms. 
 
Bonnet macaques – the species and the troops 
The bonnet macaque (Macaca radiata), a cercopithecine 
primate found only in peninsular India, usually lives in 
large troops of 8 to 60 individuals; such multimale troops 
typically contain several adult males and females, as well 
as juveniles and infants of both sexes19. Female bonnet 
macaques, like many other cercopithecines, usually remain 
in their natal group throughout their lives, and during 
adulthood, form strong, linear dominance hierarchies 
with daughters occupying dominance ranks just below 
those of their mothers. Adult females develop strong so-
cial bonds and display extensive allogrooming and other 
affiliative behaviour towards one another19. Juvenile and 
adult males, on the other hand, usually emigrate from 
their natal troops, but bonnet macaque males appear to be 
unique in being rather unpredictable in this regard, some 
individuals even staying back to become the most domi-
nant males in their respective natal troops19. Adult males 
form unstable dominance hierarchies through direct aggres-
sion and coalitions, and, unusually for most cercopitheci-
nes, exhibit extensive affiliative interactions with one 
another19. 
 Our insights into the social knowledge underlying  
decision-making processes in bonnet macaques come 
from a three-year study (from 1993 to 1996) on a wild 
troop (Troop G I) inhabiting dry deciduous scrubland and 
mixed forests around Bangalore city10. During the course 
of this study, the troop had 44–52 individuals, including 
8–11 adult males, 11 adult females and 22–30 juveniles 
and infants. Data on tactical deception are derived from 
observations on this troop as well as from a second troop 
(Troop G II) occupying an adjacent, partially overlapping 
home range during the same study period. This troop 
consisted of 30–35 individuals with 5–7 adult males, 10 
adult females and 15–20 juveniles and infants. In addition, 
tactical deception was also studied in a third troop (Troop 
B I) inhabiting the Bannerghata National Park near  
Bangalore. This troop, consisting of 3–4 adult males, 6 
adult females, 8 subadult males, and 8–14 juveniles and 
infants, was studied for a period of about 12 months during 
1999–2000. 
 Data on social knowledge and tactical deception were 
obtained by behavioural observations on all individually 
identified adult and subadult animals in the respective 
study troops; each sampling day usually consisted of 10 h 
of observation, from 0800 to 1800 h (ref. 10). The samp-
ling methods used included focal animal sampling with 
samples of 15 min duration each on an individual chosen 
randomly without replacement, and opportunistic sequ-
ence sampling of rare behavioural events and social in-
teractions involving more than two individuals10. The 
results reported here are based on approximately 1800 h 
of observation on the three troops, sampling effort being 
comparable across all adult and subadult individuals in 
all these troops. 
 
Social knowledge 
An important component of social cognition is the social 
knowledge that individual primates might possess with 
regard to certain attributes of other individuals that they 
regularly interact with within their social group. In addition 
to the obvious recognition of each animal as a distinct 
individual, the possible attributes that such knowledge 
might encompass could include their dominance ranks 
and affiliative relationships – factors that seem to influ-
ence much of the social behaviour observed in primate 
societies. 
 A recent study on bonnet macaques documented a fre-
quent interaction between adult females – allogrooming 
supplants – in which a dominant female displaces one 
member of a pair of grooming females (see Figure 1), 
both subordinate to her10. In a majority of these observed 
supplants (~ 80%), the most subordinate of the three indi-
viduals left her grooming partner as soon as she noticed 
the dominant female approaching them – such females 
were thus clearly aware of their own subordinate status 
relative to the other two individuals10. On about 20% of 
these occasions, however, it was the other female (the 
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more dominant of the two allogrooming individuals) that 
left – and the factor that most significantly appeared to 
influence this decision was the social attractiveness of 
her grooming partner, defined in terms of the amount and 
consistency of allogrooming that this individual received 
from all the other adult females in the troop10. These 
dominant females thus retreated when their grooming 
partners, though subordinate in rank, were more socially 
attractive, receiving relatively higher levels of allogroo-
ming more consistently from all the other adult females 
in the troop. Bonnet macaque females, therefore, are 
clearly aware of the social attractiveness of their groom-
ing companions and thus seem to be knowledgeable 
about the social relationships maintained by the other 
females in the troop. 
 That individual females might also know the relative 
dominance ranks of their troop members was revealed by 
the typical patterns of aggressive behaviour and allo-
grooming choices that occurred during other similar tri-
adic interactions. If neither of the two allogrooming 
subordinate females retreated when the third dominant 
female approached them, for example, the latter usually 
displayed aggression towards the more subordinate of the 
two females10. Occasionally, however, she did not dis-
play any agonistic behaviour but proceeded to directly 
allogroom one of the two individuals– and, in the majority 
of these cases, she groomed the more dominant female10. 
The approaching female thus seemed to be aware of the 
relative dominance ranks of the two other females, both 
subordinate to her. 
 Logistic regression analysis of the decisions made by 
the females indicated that three factors were taken into 
consideration when they decided to either remain behind 
or retreat during allogrooming supplants: knowledge of 
the subject’s own dominance rank, her rank difference 
with the approaching dominant female and rank difference 
with her grooming companion10. Individuals are thus 
clearly aware not only of their own positions in the rank 
hierarchy, but also that of the other females in the troop. 
A model which incorporated the absolute dominance 
ranks of the latter, however, failed to explain the obser-
ved behavioural patterns10. Knowledge of another indi-
vidual’s dominance rank is, therefore, egotistical in that it 
seems to be acquired only relative to one’s own; a female 
knows of her rank difference with another female, but 
does not appear to be aware of the absolute position of 
her adversary in the rank hierarchy. 
 The observation that rank difference with the approach-
ing dominant female and that with the grooming com- 
panion both influenced the decision-making process  
indicates that a bonnet macaque’s knowledge system is 
integrative in nature – females are able to simultaneously 
process information about all their interacting com- 
panions and use this knowledge effectively during social 
interactions. The decisions made in this particular situ-
ation were, in reality, even more complex: the inter- 
mediate female in a grooming supplant chose to retreat as 
the approaching individual became relatively more domi-
nant to her, while her grooming companion became com-
paratively more subordinate (as also more socially 
attractive). 
Mental representation of individual attributes 
A noteworthy observation in this study was that individual 
macaques seem to be knowledgeable about the general 
social attractiveness of particular females in terms of the 
allogrooming that they receive from other individuals, 
rather than remember specific pair-wise affiliative rela-
tionships10. Since, as mentioned earlier, they also know 
the relative dominance rank of each adult female in the 
troop, this seems to constitute a clear example of recogni-
tion of individuality and individual attributes by these 
animals. Furthermore, the decision to retreat or remain 
behind during allogrooming supplants also depended on 
the absolute position of the actor in the dominance hier-
archy – the more subordinate an individual the more 
likely she was to retreat10. Clearly then, each bonnet  
macaque female has knowledge of some of her own indi-
vidual attributes as well. 
 Although all of these abilities must obviously call for 
some form of fairly sophisticated mental representation 
of particular individuals, including themselves, associ-
ated with their specific properties, what remains unclear 
is how exactly such information is categorized and coded 
for in the non-verbal cognitive architecture of the maca-
que mind. It is also important to note that during triadic 
interactions, the integrative property of the bonnet maca-
que’s knowledge system allows her to respond appropri-
ately to the relative dominance ranks of the other 
interacting individuals. It is striking, therefore, that what-
ever may be the stored imagery of the individual attrib-




Figure 1. Two adult female bonnet macaques allogrooming. The 
most common affiliative social interaction displayed by primates, al-
logrooming not only leads to the cleaning of the hair and removal of 
ectoparasites, but, more importantly, serves to strengthen social bonds 
in different situations. 
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possible for her to access both these sources and integrate 
them when finally making a socially complex decision. 
Attribution of motives and formation of a belief 
system 
Since during allogrooming supplants, the dominant 
member of the grooming dyad is more likely to retreat if 
her grooming partner is socially attractive, these females 
behave as if they ‘believe’ that the approaching indivi-
dual is targetting their subordinate, but usually more  
socially attractive companion. Bonnet macaques thus 
seem to be capable of attributing motives to other indi-
viduals within their social matrix, suggesting that they 
may be able to develop beliefs about such motives. 
 It would appear that this decision to retreat was taken 
on the basis of a belief that a highly socially-attractive 
individual is more likely, in general, to be the preferred 
target for affiliative interactions, even if she holds a rela-
tively low position in the dominance hierarchy. That such 
a belief might indeed be valid is supported by our earlier 
observation that there was a strong positive correlation 
between the number of approaches that the subordinate 
female of the allogrooming dyad received from other 
females and her social attractiveness10. The nature of this 
belief and the attribution of a corresponding motive to the 
approaching individual also seem to be rather pragmatic, 
since bonnet macaque females evaluate social attractive-
ness of an individual on the basis of the levels of allog-
rooming received and the consistency with which such 
grooming is received from other females in the troop. 
Projection of experience? 
An interesting insight into the nature of this particular 
belief system comes from the actual choices that the 
troop females made in their display of aggression and 
grooming preferences during triadic interactions. Thus, 
when a grooming supplant did not actually occur, as des-
cribed above, the approaching individuals were most 
likely to display aggression and chase away the more 
subordinate of the two individuals, while on other occa-
sions, if they did not demonstrate any aggression, they 
almost invariably preferred to groom the more dominant 
member of the dyad. Why then occasionally did the more 
dominant member of the allogrooming dyad retreat? One 
possible answer to this question is that bonnet macaque 
females may form a general belief system regarding the 
social attractiveness of the other females in the troop and 
motives may be attributed to the approaching females dur-
ing triadic interactions in accordance with such a system. 
 This belief system may, however, be an erroneous 
one – and this is revealed by the fact that although the 
approaching females usually chose the dominant member 
of the allogrooming dyad as a grooming companion during 
allogrooming supplants, these same females retreated 
when they were, in turn, approached while grooming a 
socially attractive subordinate. In other words, individual 
females exhibited this erroneous behaviour even though, 
on several occasions, they themselves had preferentially 
allogroomed the dominant member of a grooming pair 
after approaching such dyads. 
 Could this be considered a failure, in some sense, of 
macaque females to project their own past experiences, 
and thus to adopt different, but suitable, behavioural 
strategies under changing situations? Thus, is it possible 
that a bonnet macaque female, as the dominant member 
of a grooming pair, is unable to attribute the correct motive 
to an approaching individual, although she herself had 
such a motive earlier as an approaching individual? If 
this is indeed true, bonnet macaques are similar to rhesus 
macaques, which were unable to empathize with and un-
derstand the motivations of their partners in a laboratory 
cooperative task, although they themselves had taken up 
similar roles earlier17; as mentioned earlier, successful 
role-reversal in these experiments was necessarily accom-
panied by fresh trial-and-error learning. 
 
Tactical deception 
Human-like deception requires that an individual who 
signals information creates a false belief in another indi-
vidual, the audience. The signaller thus needs to recog-
nize that the mind of the audience can be in a state of 
knowledge that is different from one’s own and that it is 
possible to alter and hence, control mental states of others 
without necessarily changing one’s own. Such manipula-
tions are usually tactical in that they involve the use of 
acts from the normal repertoire of the actor in situations 
where they are likely to be misinterpreted by the audi-
ence – leading to some tangible benefit for the actor with 
or without some corresponding cost to the audience20,21. 
 All such acts of tactical deception are thus functional, 
and most cases of deception documented in primates can 
be included in this category21. But is primate deception 
truly intentional, attributable to a theory of mind (see  
ref. 22 for a theoretical discussion)? Does the deceiver 
actually attempt to alter the beliefs of another individual 
when it actively suppresses some information or signals 
false information to the other? Or, has experience simply 
taught the deceiver the use of certain behavioural strategies 
in particular situations, leading to predictable responses 
from the audience and thus allowing the actor to achieve 
a desired goal? 
Mind-reading or behaviour-reading? 
A total of 128 events of social interactions that could 
potentially be considered deceptive was observed in the 
three study troops of bonnet macaques over the entire 
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study period, and the overwhelming majority of these 
provide clear evidence for tactical deception over other 
competing explanations23. It is also noteworthy that al-
though individuals in all the troops exhibited comparable 
levels of deception overall (ranging from an average of 
0.0025 to 0.0060 acts/h/individual in the three troops), 
the troops differed widely with regard to the social situations 
– competition for food, mates and grooming partners, as 
well as aggressive interactions (see Figure 2) – during 
which tactical deception was displayed (Figure 3). There 
were also striking differences in the distribution of decep-
tive acts across the 15 categories of deception commonly 
used by individuals in each of these troops (Figure 4). 
 A striking feature of the deception displayed by bonnet 
macaques is the remarkable individual variation in the 
performance of these acts23. Certain individuals thus ex-
hibited deceptive acts with very high frequency at levels 
significantly greater than that shown by other individuals 
within the troop; moreover, such deceptive abilities appe-
ared to be independent of age categories and dominance 
ranks of the actors. The fact that certain individuals are 
more adept at deception than others, and that the ability to 
deceive is independent of other individual attributes, in-
cluding age, is an indication that many of these acts could 
involve mentalism on the part of the actor rather than 
simple behaviour analysis (since the latter would usually 
imply that rates of deception would increase with age 
and/or experience). It could, of course, be true that these 
particular individuals are good social learners and, there-
fore, more efficient behaviour analysts. This, however, 
seems unlikely since it would require complex behavioural 
contingencies (given the type of situations where tactical 
deception is actually shown) to occur with high 
probabilities for individuals to learn such associations 
successfully; such contingencies appeared to be relatively 
rare in the social sphere of the study troops (pers. obs.). 
 If, on the one hand, macaques are indeed better social 
learners than mentalists while, on the other, complex social 
situations where deceptive behaviour could potentially be 
learnt are rare, it might be predicted that individuals who 
exhibit high levels of deception should perform the same 
acts repeatedly. However, for the deception displayed by 
males in all the study troops, there was significant positive 
correlation between the frequency of deceptive acts and 
the functional categories to which these acts belonged 
(Figure 5); in other words, individuals who deceived at 
relatively higher levels, did so in many more different 
ways. This is an indication that these individuals may 
have indeed been better cheaters, with perhaps greater 
insights into the power of manipulative behaviour than 
other individuals in the same troop. A particularly illumi-
nating example comes from Troop B I in which nine out 
of the 16 acts of deception observed among the eight 
 
 
Figure 2. Concealment by ignoring—a form of simple tactical decep-
tion. Victims of aggression often exhibit different types of displace-
ment behaviour; this adult male perfunctorily chews on a dry twig as 
he ignores his aggressor sitting close by and thus conceals any expres-




























Figure 3. Tactical deception displayed by male and female bonnet macaques in the Troops G I, 
G II and B I during different social situations – competition for mates (sex), food (food) and 
allogrooming partners (affiliation), and agonistic interactions (aggression). 
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resident males were performed within a period of eight 
months by a single young subadult male who had recen-
tly joined the troop; remarkably, these nine acts belonged 
to nine different categories of deception! 
 Moreover, certain rare acts of tactical deception dis-
played by the study individuals were extremely complex 
and involved several simple categories of deceptive acts 
juxtaposed together and performed in rapid succession to 
achieve one particular desired goal (Categories of decep-
tion X–XIV in Figure 4). The probability that these indi-
viduals had experienced an earlier identical behavioural 
contingency for them to learn all the constituent decep-
tive acts is indeed very low; moreover, virtually all these 
complex, deceptive, behavioural sequences were per-
formed only on a single occasion each during the entire 
study period. 
 If the argument put forward regarding the involvement of 
the mind in at least some of the acts of tactical deception 
displayed by bonnet macaques can be accepted, it would 
seem logical that such manipulation must necessarily  
involve at least second-order intentionality. This would 
mean, in simple terms, that an individual performs a  
deceptive act in order to change the belief system of the 


























Figure 4. Distribution of deceptive acts across different categories of tactical deception exhibited 
by Troops G I, G II and B I. Categories of deception are: Simple – IA, Concealment by hiding be-
hind a physical barrier; IB, Concealment by hiding away from the troop; II, Concealment by inhibit-
ing interest in object; III, Concealment by ignoring; IV, Distraction by calling; V, Distraction by 
threat; VI, Distraction by close-range behaviour; VII, Creating a neutral image; VIII, Creating a 
positive image; IX, Deflection to third party; and Complex – X, Concealment by hiding behind a 
physical barrier and concealment by inhibiting interest in object; XI, Concealment by inhibiting 
interest in object and distraction by close-range behaviour; XII, Distraction by leading and distrac-
tion by calling; XIII, Distraction by threat and distraction by close-range behaviour; XIV, Conceal-






























Figure 5. Correlation between the number of deceptive acts and the number of categories of tacti-
cal deception in which they were performed by males in the three study troops. Each point represents 
a single individual. Kendall’s rank correlation: τ = 0.6352, n = 17, P < 0.001. 
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which has been generated, to achieve a particular personal 
goal. 
Visual perspective-taking 
Several events of deception by three individuals in two 
different troops involved acts of physical concealment 
(see Figure 4) in which the actor either simply hid from 
the target behind some physical object or performed a 
behaviour surreptitiously behind a barrier, occasionally 
leaning out to inspect whether the target individual was 
still present. Since all these individuals repeatedly per-
formed this exercise – in different contexts and using dif-
ferent objects or barriers to hide behind – these acts 
would appear to represent a genuine tactic and were pos-
sibly not simply events coincident by chance alone. 
 This kind of visual perspective-taking, estimating what 
would be visible from another individual’s point of view, 
has earlier been seen in other primates, notably chimpan-
zees and baboons20. Such an ability to recognize and utilize 
the geometric perspective of another individual has been 
equated to being able to represent correctly another indi-
vidual’s mental representation in one’s own mind, al-
though there have also been dissenting views on such an 
identity (see ref. 24 for a detailed discussion). 
‘Intention to deceive’ as an intervening variable? 
Another characteristic feature of the tactical deception 
exhibited by bonnet macaques was that individuals did 
not invariably use deceptive strategies in apparently iden-
tical situations, a result not expected if these acts were 
being performed in response to certain behavioural con-
tingencies alone. What is difficult to rule out, of course, 
is that there were subtle differences in these apparently 
identical situations – and these may have triggered-off 
the deceptive acts in some of them, but not in others. 
 A related finding to this form of volitional control of 
deception was that of some individual adult males who 
changed their repertoire of deceptive acts following 
changes in the social environment. This happened when 
two particular males emigrated out of one troop and joined 
a neighbouring one; following this movement, they dis-
played very different categories of deceptive acts and one 
of them even exhibited a five-fold increase in the fre-
quency of his deception. A major difference that these 
individuals faced in the two situations was that of their 
dominance ranks, which fell drastically once they had 
joined the new troop. It is, therefore, entirely possible 
that the perception of their specific positions in the rank 
hierarchy in the respective troops as well as the changing 
demands of the new social milieu may have triggered on 
a completely different repertoire as well as increased 
rates of deceptive acts in these two males. 
 It is perhaps possible to model a complex set of stimulus– 
response links in the different social situations outlined 
above, leading to differential responses in terms of the 
deceptive acts displayed by specific individuals. It might, 
however, be more parsimonious to consider ‘intention to 
deceive’ as an intervening variable in these different 
situations, as outlined by Whiten13. This would mean that 
a variety of perceptual changes under different social 
conditions would be translated into either the presence or 
absence of potentially deceptive acts or into different 
forms of deceptive acts, all of these mediated by an inten-
tion or lack thereof to deceive. In addition to simplifying 
a possibly complex web of conditional stimulus–response 
chains, such an intervening variable would also be com-
patible with the notion of second-order intentionality 
underlying deception, outlined above. 
An incomplete theory of mind? 
Subordinate adult bonnet macaque males often give out 
loud predator alarm calls when they are chased by more 
dominant males – even if there are no predators in the 
vicinity. An extremely intriguing variant of this deceptive 
act was observed in one of the study troops. A victim of 
aggression emitted a false predator alarm call on being 
chased, but continued to give this call even as he descen-
ded from the tree and continued to walk on the ground –
behaviour that would never have been performed if there 
was truly a predator around (see also ref. 1 for a compa-
rable incident). 
 Deceiving individuals thus occasionally exhibit behav-
ioural components that are not compatible with their own 
apparent ‘belief’ system, as communicated to others. An 
important point here is that notwithstanding its incomplete-
ness, such a belief system must have been generated to alter 
the belief state of the audience – a return to second- order 
intentionality. What is also noteworthy is that the aggressor 
did not appear to have read the internal inconsistency of the 
victim’s deceptive act; this may have been due to his own 
theory of mind being similarly incomplete1. 
Summary 
Cercopithecine or Old World monkey societies are typi-
cally characterized by social relationships established 
between individuals belonging to different age cohorts, 
dominance ranks and kinship groups. Given the unique 
nature of every relationship that individuals need to deve-
lop and maintain, it is perhaps not surprising that bonnet 
macaques may be inherently capable of solving many 
complex social problems. These monkeys may, for ex-
ample, observe the social interactions of other individuals 
in the troop and acquire knowledge of different attributes 
of these individuals, thus aiding their own decision-
making during social interactions. Many individuals are 
also potentially capable of developing strategies of tacti-
cal deception; these strategies not only encompass differ-
ent categories of deceptive acts but are also employed in 
a variety of social situations, including agonistic interac-
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tions and competition over food, allogrooming compan-
ions and sexual partners. 
 Underlying these complex social strategies may be the 
ability of individual macaques to form rudimentary men-
tal representations of their social interactants and their 
various attributes, including their relative dominance 
ranks and social attractiveness. Interestingly, an elaborate 
example of tool manufacture and use by a bonnet macaque, 
documented earlier, indicated the possibility that the in-
dividual was able to perceive the underlying causality of 
its actions and also form a mental model of the tool to 
which it could repeatedly refer25. The cognitive ability to 
form mental representations could thus underlie the bon-
net macaque’s interactions with both the mechanical as 
well as the social components of its immediate environment. 
 Analyses of the decision-making processes that bonnet 
macaques employ during social interactions indicate that 
individuals appear to attribute distinct motives to other 
individuals, a clear example of second-order intentionality. 
Moreover, several acts of tactical deception provide evi-
dence that the macaques are capable of attributing visual 
perspectives to another individual, thus being able to per-
ceive what would be visible from that particular indivi-
dual’s point of view. This arguably constitutes another 
way in which a monkey is able to comprehend another 
monkey’s mental representation of the world – again a 
prime cognitive candidate for second-order intentionality. 
 Bonnet macaques, it can be argued, may thus have 
some degree of comprehension of the mental world of 
other individuals and are able to attribute distinct indi-
viduality to each other, including themselves. But does 
this imply that they have a theory of mind? It has been 
discussed above that during social interactions, indivi-
duals may fail to project their own experiences onto others, 
and are thus often unable to correctly predict the true 
motives of other individuals. Moreover, even in instances 
of tactical deception where the macaques communicate 
their apparent ‘beliefs’ to others, they exhibit behavioural 
components incompatible with their own beliefs. Exten-
sive observational investigations on the study troops have 
also so far failed to turn up any clear evidence for unam-
biguous third-order intentionality, which could be con-
sidered evidence for a true theory of mind. In conclusion, 
therefore, even if bonnet macaques do have a rudimen-
tary theory of mind, it is a construct incomplete in many 
ways, some of which have been outlined here and some 
that still remain to be discovered. 
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